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Abstract—The global Electronic Health Record (EHR) market
is growing dramatically and expected to reach $39.7 billions
by 2022. To safe-guard security and privacy of EHR, access
control is an essential mechanism for managing EHR data. This
paper proposes a hybrid architecture to facilitate access control
of EHR data by using both blockchain and edge node. Within
the architecture, a blockchain-based controller manages identity
and access control policies and serves as a tamper-proof log of
access events. In addition, off-chain edge nodes store the EHR
data and apply policies specified in Abbreviated Language For
Authorization (ALFA) to enforce attribute-based access control
on EHR data in collaboration with the blockchain-based access
control logs. We evaluate the proposed hybrid architecture by
utilizing Hyperledger Composer Fabric blockchain to measure
the performance of executing smart contracts and ACL policies
in terms of transaction processing time and response time against
unauthorized data retrieval.
Index Terms—Attribute-based Access Control, Access Control
List, Blockchain, Edge Computing, Hyperledger, Smart Contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
In eHealth, data for the Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
of patients can be gathered from multiple sources, such as
wearable devices, smart sensors, and medical imaging equip-
ment. It has been reported that the amount of EHR data
will continue to grow at a rate of 48% each year to reach
2,314 zettabytes by 2020 [1]. However, according to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, there were more
than 2,181 cases of healthcare data violations between 2009
and 2017, resulting in the exposure of 176,709,305 medical
records [2]. As a result, safe-guarding the EHR data has
become a pivotal issue in eHealth. Although encryption ad-
dresses some fundamental security and privacy issues of EHR,
access control, in particular, is difficult to enforce effectively
due to the highly distributed and fragmented nature of EHR
data and the complex relationship between data owners and
data users. Therefore, providing a flexible and fine-grained
access control solution for EHR data is of paramount interest.
Recently, blockchain has been suggested to be a promising
solution for EHR data management [3]. The inherent secure-
by-design feature of a blockchain-based infrastructure has the
potential to provide a tamper-proof log for all the access events
of EHR. In particular, all the access events can be verified and
recorded through a consensus mechanism before being added
to the blockchain. However, from the prospective of EHR
management, the traditional blockchain-based solutions suffer
from two significant drawbacks. First, although blockchain can
ensure data integrity, it lacks proper access control mecha-
nisms to contain operations performed by different partici-
pants. Second, the size of blocks in a blockchain is too limited
to accommodate EHR data containing images (e.g., X-ray, CT
scan, and MRI) and/or videos (e.g., ultrasound).
This paper proposes a hybrid architecture of using both
blockchain and edge nodes to facilitate attribute-based access
control of EHR data. Specifically, the Hyperledger Composer
Fabric [4] blockchain executes smart contracts programmed
with Access Control Lists (ACLs) to enforce identity-based ac-
cess control of EHR data and log legitimate access events into
blockchain for traceability and accountability. In collaboration,
edge nodes store EHR data and further enforce attribute-based
access control (ABAC)1 of EHR data with policies specified
in the Abbreviated Language For Authorization (ALFA) [6].
ALFA maps directly into eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) and provides succinct representation. In
addition, hash digest is used to protect the integrity of EHR
data stored in the edge nodes, which helps detect any alter-
ation of EHR. Furthermore, one-time self-destructing urls [7],
containing the addresses of EHR data on the edge nodes, are
referenced in smart contracts, which will be returned to the
healthcare providers after the successful execution of the ACL
access policy. The healthcare providers then use the urls to
access EHR data from edge nodes. Therefore, only eligible
users who pass the attribute-based access control imposed by
edge nodes can access the requested EHR data.
To validate our design, we prototype the hybrid architec-
ture by using the Hyperledger Composer Fabric platform. In
addition, we conduct multiple experiments to validate both
smart contracts and access control policies which show that
the proposed system can maintain a traceable access events and
transaction records for EHR data management. We evaluate the
system performance, via multiple experiments, of the transac-
tion processing time and the average response time against
unauthorized EHR data request under different settings.
1ABAC is formally defined as an access control method where subject
requests to perform operations on objects are granted or denied based
on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes of the object,
environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms of
those attributes and conditions [5].
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the backgrounds of attribute-based access control
with XACML and ALFA, edge node with eHealth sensor
platform, and Hyperledger Composer Fabric platform. The
proposed hybrid architecture of using both blockchain and
edge nodes to facilitate ABAC policies of EHR data and the
detailed designs of ACL policies are presented in Section III.
In Section IV, we conduct experiments to test access control
mechanisms and the performance of the system. In Section
V, we analyse the proposed scheme with respect to potential
attacks. Related work is described in Section VI, and Section
VII concludes the paper with future research directions.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we review the eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML), the Abbreviated Language For
Authorization (ALFA), eHealth sensor platform and edge
node, and the Hyperledger Composer Fabric platform.
A. XACML and ALFA
XACML is a standard that defines a fine-grained, attribute-
based access control policy language. XACML also defines a
reference architecture and a processing model to evaluate ac-
cess requests according to the rules defined in access policies.
User
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Request record #1 View record #1
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 view
 record #1?
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Manage policies
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Fig. 1: XACML architecture and processing model.
As shown in Fig. 1, the architecture of XACML consists
of the following components. The Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) inspects a user’s access request, converts the request
into an XACML authorization request and forward it to the
Policy Decision Point (PDP) to obtain an access decision (e.g.,
permit or deny), and acts on the received decision. The Policy
Administration Point (PAP) is responsible for managing access
control policies. PDP evaluates incoming requests against
policies it has been configured with and returns access decision
(approve or deny). PDP may also use Policy Information Point
(PIP) to retrieve attribute values. PIP connects PDP to retrieve
external sources such as source of attribute values (i.e. a
resource, subject, environment).
However, due to the verbose design pattern and complicated
syntax of XACML, many developers find it difficult to write
and read XACML scripts. As a result, we use ALFA, which
can specify access control policies and be mapped directly
into XACML structures. ALFA contains the same elements
as XACML defined and inherit the overall structure and
concepts of XACML. The key components of ALFA are:
Attributes, Target, Conditions, Rule, Policy, and Obligation.
We use ALFA to enforce ABAC policies for EHR data stored
in edge nodes. By utilizing above components of ALFA, we
can impose various ABAC policies on EHR data, based on
data owner’s specification to provide a comprehensive decision
process.
B. eHealth Sensor Platform and Edge Node
Recent advancements in smart wearable sensor technologies
enable EHR systems to collect patient’s bio-metric data. For
example, the MySignals [8] eHealth sensor platform, shown
in Fig. 2, measures 16 different bio-metric parameters via
different sensors, such as blood pressure sensor, airflow sensor,
Electrocardiogram sensor (ECG), Electromyography sensor
(EMG), snore sensor, body position sensor, and Galvanic
Skin response sensor (GSR). Such platform may also upload
EHR data directly to an edge node via WiFi or communicate
the EHR data to patient’s smartphone via Bluetooth, which
uploads the EHR to the edge node, as depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 2: eHealth sensor platform.
WiFi AP
Edge Node
Fig. 3: Data collection from sensors to an edge node.
C. Hyperledger Composer Fabric Platform
Hyperledger [9] is an open source blockchain project started
in December 2015 by the Linux Foundation and supported by
industrial companies such as IBM, Intel and SAP. Hyperledger
Composer Fabric [4] is a blockchain implementation platform
providing a modular and extensible architecture that allows
components, such as consensus mechanism, to be plug-and-
play. In addition, it leverages the container technology to
host smart contracts, termed “chaincode,” that comprise the
application logic of the system [4].
Hyperledger Composer Fabric supports chaincode written in
Go and JavaScript out-of-the-box, and other languages such as
Java by installing appropriate modules [9]. As a result, Hy-
perledger Composer Fabric is more flexible than the Ethereum
blockchain platform which only support a closed smart con-
tract language named Solidity. Compared with Ethereum’s
public and permissionless blockchain network, Hyperledger
provides a private and permissioned network which enables
that only privileged entities and nodes can participate in the
network. Moreover, Hyperledger has a modular architecture
and provides a lot of flexibility in how you want to use it.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we illustrate the hybrid architecture to
facilitate access control of EHR data by using both blockchain
and edge node. By referring to Fig. 4, we first enumerate the
following entities which take part in the architecture.
• Patient: A patient is an entity who owns the EHR data
to be accessed. A patient may specify the access policies
for the EHR data he/she owns.
• Healthcare provider: A healthcare provider (e.g., doctor
and nurse) is an entity who needs to access EHR data
owned by patients. A healthcare provider actively seeks
access authorizations from patients.
• Smart sensor/imaging equipment: A smart sensor is a
device which collects EHR data from patients and sends
it to the edge node. Imaging equipment may include X-
ray, CT scan, MRI, and ultrasound, which generate EHR
data from patients.
• EHR data: An EHR data is a piece of information owned
by a patient, and can be accessed by authorized healthcare
providers.
• Edge node: An edge node is a computing and storage
device which stores EHR data and imposes attribute-
based access control policies.
• Blockchain: Blockchain is utilized as the controller of
the architecture which manages access control policies
and serves as a tamper-proof access log.
Access control workflow on the architecture is depicted as
Fig. 5. First, smart sensors and imaging equipment collect
EHR data from the patient and upload it to the edge node.
Second, the edge node applies ABAC policies to enforce the
access permissions for the EHR data and returns a one-time
self-destructing url to the patient which contains the address
of the EHR on the edge node. Third, the same patient will
register with the Hyperledger Composer Fabric blockchain and
define the Access Control List (ACL) policy to declare access
permissions to the healthcare providers. Next, Doctors/nurses
can send the access request through smart contract, and it
will check the identity information against ACL policy. If the
condition has been satisfied, the smart contract will return the
corresponding url address to locate the edge node which stores
the EHR data separately. Finally, Doctor or nurses can get
access to EHR data as long as they satisfy the requirement of
ABAC policies enforced on the EHR data.
In the remainder of this section, we first illustrate the Hy-
perledger Composer Fabric blockchain network and describe
the design of ACL policy. Next, we describe the hash digest
mechanism for EHR data and one-time self-destructing urls.
A. Hyperledger Composer Fabric Blockchain Network and
Access Control List with Smart Contract
To implement and evaluate the access control mechanism,
we designed and developed a blockchain-based web applica-
tion on the Hyperledger Composer Fabric. As shown in Fig. 6,
the Hyperledger Composer Fabric infrastructure contains four
programmable parts. The first part is to define the network
features in a Model File (.cto), which includes participants,
url addresses, transactions, and an access control log. The
second part is to write smart contracts in the Script File (.js),
which contain transaction processing functions. The third part
is to define ACL rules for different participants in the Access
Control File (.acl). Finally, database queries are defined in the
Query File (.qry).
Hyperledger Composer Fabric provides a developing plat-
form for blockchain-based applications, such as cryptocurren-
cies. However, a cogitative component in the design is still
needed to transform the Blockchain network from cryptocur-
rencies to our proposed system. In a classic cryptocurrency
architecture, participants represent people or organizations
who take part in the business network. Authorized by ACL,
participants are allowed to transact assets (e.g., Bitcoins)
among the network. Above all, business logic for transactions
are defined in smart Contract. In this architecture, blockchain
network is still limited to digital-currency use case.
In our proposed system, participants represent patients and
doctors. Patients EHR address is saved as personal asset in the
blockchain network. In other words, patient and EHR asset
have one-to-one pair relationship, which are both identified
by patient ID. Authorized by ACL, a doctor is allowed to
retrieve his patients EHR addresses while the patient is only
allowed to retrieve his or her own EHR address. The retrieving
function is defined as transaction process in the smart contract
and invoked by participants submitting their requests. Finally,
all historical retrieving events are saved as immutable and
traceable EHR access control log on the blockchain network.
After the edge nodes collect the EHR data from the patient,
the patient can enforce the ACL policy on his or her EHR
data. By defining the ACL policies, it can determine which
data users are allowed to read, write, and update the content.
When the ACL policy is available in blockchain network, data
users such as a doctor or a nurse can send the access request to
the patient to get access approval and receive the url address
for the actual EHR data stored in the edge node.
An ACL policy is defined with the follows components:
• Subjects: It defines the person or entity which is involved
in the ACL procedure.
Patient Smart Sensor/ Imaging Equipment
Collect dat a ALFA policy for ABACEdge NodePrevious Hash (Block i-1) Previous Hash (Block i)Block #i Block #i+1EHR AC Log EHR AC Log ....Check attributes, access policy (Using url)
Healthcare provider
Get url result
Sent request
                Get data
Hyperledger Composer Fabric BlockchainAC L policy Fig. 4: Hybrid architecture of blockchain and edge node.• Operations: It indicates the action which the rule gov-erns. In our scheme, three actions are supported: READ,WRITE, and UPDATE.• Objects: It defines the objects which the ACL rules
applies to. It can be either a single document of EHR
data or a complicated union of EHR data.
• Conditions: It is an AND-gate policy expression over
multiple variables. In addition, our scheme can support
if(...) expression for the complex condition of ACL rules.
• Actions: It indicates the final action of the ACL rules. It
must be either ALLOW or DENY.
We define two types of ACL rules: non-conditional and
conditional. Non-conditional rules are used to control access
policy to a specific group of participants. On contrast, condi-
tional ACL rules can express various AND-gate access control
policy and return the Boolean result on the action result. For
instance, the rule below states that only the doctors from the
Christiana Hospital can READ the EHR data from patients:
rule Rule1 {
description: "Only doctor from the
Christiana Hospital can read data"
subject(v): "Christiana.Doctor"
operation: READ
object(t):"Christiana.patient#123.data"
condition: "v.role == Doctor &&
v.organization == Christiana"
action: ALLOW
}
The use of ACL policy provides the access control log of
events to EHR data, determining the ability to read, write
or update. In another words, we provide the conditions and
restrictions as to: ‘who’ has the ability to do ‘what’ on the
blockchain ledger.
B. Hash Digest for EHR Data
When the edge node sends the url results back to the patient,
it includes the hash digest result for the EHR data. The hash
digest result contains a string of digits created by a one-way
hashing formula. The hash digest function can protect the
integrity of EHR data and detect changes or alterations to any
part of the data. Comparing the hash digests result, people can
determine whether any changes have been made on EHR data.
If EHR data has been modified, the hash digest is different
from the original one.
Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) is the latest member of
Secure Hash Algorithm standard released by NIST on August
2015 [10]. By including the hash digest result into the smart
contract and transaction, that piece of information is forever
saved on the blockchain network. For instance, in Fig. 7 the
original EHR saves the information as “Pulse = 78 bpm” and
it generates the corresponding hash digest. If later someone
maliciously alters the EHR as “Pulse = 68 bpm” or “Pulse =
79 bpm”, the system will automatically generate a new hash
digest indicating that the EHR data has been tampered.
C. One-time Self-Destructing URLs
After a doctor sends an access request to the blockchain
network, the enforced ACL policy will check the information
provided by the doctor. If the identity information satisfies
ACL policy, the smart contract executed between the patient
and the doctor saves the access log into the blockchain network
and returns a one time self-destructing url to the address of
EHR data.
We use https://1ty.me/ [7] to contain the address
of EHR data stored in edge nodes. https://1ty.me/
runs on HTTPS and the EHR data address information is
encrypted. The key to decrypt the address is a portion of
data which is contained in the url. This generated url is not
stored on the https://1ty.me/ server. As a result, only
  Edge NodeBlockchain(EHR Access Control Log)
Smart sensor collect EHR Data
         Deploy smart contract
            (ACL policy included)
Send access request to blockchain
Get one-time self destructing URL
Check ACL conditions
Save AC Log
ABAC enforced
Get URL result
Send data access request to edge node
Check attributes, access policy
Get EHR data
Fig. 5: Access control workflow.
Fig. 6: Hyperledger Composer Fabric infrastructure.
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Fig. 7: A SHA-3 hash function at work.
the valid and one-time url link can display and decrypt the
address information. Once the address information is viewed,
the encrypted information will be removed from the system
and the url link will vanish and cannot be accessed again.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of
the proposed hybrid access control system prototyped on the
Hyperledger Composer Fabric framework. Fig. 8 shows an
example experiment with two doctors and five patients as
participants, where each participant has a unique digital ID
card to log into the blockchain network. The first three patients
scheduled appointments with doctor #1 and the remaining two
patients scheduled appointments with doctor #2. We tested
the access control mechanism by logging into the prototyped
blockchain network on a Chrome browser, submitting trans-
actions, and recording access events and results of the partici-
pants. Specifically, we compared the system response time of
the systems with different numbers of patients to measure the
performance of the proposed system. The experiments were
conducted on a computer with a 2.9 GHz Intel i5 processor,
8GB of memory, and 60 Mbps of Ethernet connection as the
default configuration.
B. Experimental Results
1) Test of Access Control on Doctor: In the first exper-
iment, we log into the blockchain network as a doctor. A
doctor is allowed to access his/her list of patients, including
ID numbers, first and last names, as shown in Fig. 9. If a
doctor wants to retrieve one specific patient’s EHR data, the
doctor needs to submit a transaction request by entering the
patient’s ID number. Upon submitting the request, the system
will return the URL address of the patient’s EHR. At the
same time, the blockchain network will permanently record
this retrieval action as a transaction event, including the event
ID and the timestamp as shown in Fig. 10. Any EHR retrieval
record can be traced back in real-time for analysis.
Fig. 8: Blockchain-based EHR network login window.
Fig. 9: A doctor accesses his/her list of patients.
2) Test of Access Control on Patient: In the second exper-
iment, we change the login user to a patient who can retrieve
his or her own EHR data. Different from the doctors, a patient
is not allowed to read other patients’ information including the
names and EHRs. For instance, if patient Tony Stark (patient
ID: 1) attempts to retrieve the EHR data of patient David
Banner (patient ID: 4), the system will reject this transaction
request and return an error message indicating that this request
is not allowed, as shown in Fig. 11.
3) System Performance: For each scenario, we conducted
four rounds of tests to measure the average transaction process-
ing time and the average response time against unauthorized
retrieval, which were 40 ms and 30 ms, respectively. The fact
that our prototype can produce results in tens of milliseconds
makes the architecture suitable to be incorporated in practical
EHR access control systems. In a recent study [11], Li et al.
Fig. 10: A doctor can retrieve his/her patients’ EHRs.
Fig. 11: A patient cannot retrieve other patients’ EHRs.
showed that the performance of Hyperledger Composer Fabric
can be affected by the processor clock speed because each
participant can run the same code and save the same data in a
distributed architecture on different computers with different
specifications and workloads. Therefore, the transaction pro-
cessing time can slightly vary based on users’ devices.
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Fig. 12: Transaction processing time.
To evaluate the scalability of our design, we also conduct
extensive system performance evaluation by increasing the
number of participants from initially 5 patients to 20 patients,
80 patients and 320 patients. The average transaction process-
ing time from 4 rounds of tests [Fig. 12] remains at around
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Fig. 13: Average transaction processing time.
40 ms as shown in Fig. 13. The average response time against
unauthorized retrieval from 4 rounds of tests [Fig. 14] also
remains at around 30 ms as shown in Fig. 15. The results of
the extensive experiments demonstrate that the performance of
the proposed system is scalable.
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Fig. 14: Response time against unauthorized retrievals.
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V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the proposed
blockchain-based access control scheme against the potential
attacks.
A. EHR spoofing attack
In the proposed system, EHR data is remotely stored on an
edge node. In the meanwhile, the hash digest result about EHR
data has been stored permanently on the blockchain network
with all records of access control log. When a malicious user
attempts to tamper the EHR data, the newly generated hash
digest will be different from the original hash digest stored
in the blockchain. As a result, participants immediately find
that the EHR data has been attacked. Moreover, the proposed
scheme enforces ABAC policies on EHR data which will
also protect the integrity and security of EHR data since
unauthorized user cannot obtain the access permission.
B. Fake healthcare provider attack
As mentioned previously, our proposed scheme utilizes
the Hyperledger Composer Fabric blockchain platform as the
external controller of the blockchain network, which manages
the identities and access control log by various events and
transactions. The healthcare providers are required to get
a unique ID by registering in the blockchain. Without the
provider’s complete registry information, a malicious user
cannot impersonate the provider in order to request the EHR
data. If a user tries to retrieve information via malicious
attacks, the system can blacklist the account and all the
actions will be recorded as evidences. If all the personal
identity information along with attributes-related information
belonging to a provider has been leaked to a malicious user,
he or she may access the EHR data. However, all the access
requests and actions will have been permanently recorded in
the blockchain. When it is found later that this user’s account
has been hacked, the system can trace back the attacker’s
actions and identify the changed data.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the related work on blockchain-
based access control. Azaria et al. [12] proposed a decentral-
ized record management system to handle EHRs. The system
gives patients an immutable log and easy access to their
medical information. However, the protocol used is based
on consensus mechanism of proof-of-work which consumes
massive computing resources. Measa et al. [13] proposed a
blockchain-based solution to publishing the policies expressing
access rights of resources and allowing the distributed transfer
of such rights among users. The authors presented a Bitcoin-
based proof-of-concept implementation without describing any
experiment or evaluation. Wang et al. [14] proposed an iOS
App termed Healthcare Data Gateway based on blockchain
to enable patient to own, control and share their own data.
Ekblaw et al. [15] proposed the MedRec prototype to give
patients an immutable log and access to their medical informa-
tion across healthcare providers and treatment sites. They pro-
posed that medical stakeholders can participate in the network
as blockchain “miner.” Guo et al. [16] proposed an attribute-
based signature scheme with multiple authorities for EHR data.
In this scheme, a patient endorses a message according to
her attributes while disclosing no information other than the
evidence that the patient has attested to it. Xia et al. [17]
proposed the MedShare, a blockchain-based system for sharing
medical data in cloud repositories among different entities.
They deploy smart contracts and access control mechanisms
to track the dataflow and to detect violations.
There have been various attempts to address the proper
access control issues on data management using blockchain.
Zyskind et al. [18] described a decentralized data management
system which ensures users own and control their data and pro-
posed a protocol to enable automated access-control manager
using multi-party computation. Wang et al. [19] described a
blockchain-based framework for data sharing in decentralized
storage systems combining Ethereum blockchain and attribute-
based encryption technology. Guo et al. [20] proposed an
multi-authority attribute-based access control mechanism by
utilizing Ethereums smart contracts. Ouaddah et al. [21]
proposed the FairAccess framework to include transactions
used to grant, get, delegate, and revoke access. As a proof
of concept, FairAccess was implemented on a Raspberry Pi
device using a local blockchain.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first study to
integrate both the Hyperledger Composer Fabric blockchain
platform providing the on-chain access control logs for EHR
data with smart contracts and ACL, and the off-chain edge
nodes to enforce ABAC policies on EHR data. We also
developed a prototype of blockchain network to evaluate the
system performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a hybrid architecture of using both
blockchain and edge nodes to impose attribute-based access
control of EHR data. The architecture utilizes blockchain (1)
to execute smart contracts so as to impose ACL policy and
(2) to record legitimate access events into blockchain. In
addition, EHR data is stored on edge nodes which impose
ABAC policies specified in ALFA. We used the Hyperledger
Composer Fabric blockchain programmed with smart contracts
and ACL policies to evaluate the performance of access
control by measuring the transactions processing time and
response time against unauthorized retrieval attempts. The
experiments show that our system provides results in terms of
milliseconds making it suitable to be incorporated in real-time
and secured EHR data access control frameworks. For future
work, we plan to investigate novel consensus protocol designs
for the proposed mechanism to achieve better performance. In
addition, we plan to develop a Hyperledger-based benchmark
tool for a set of performance analyses.
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